[Distrib] Fwd: [ece-dep] Lecture by Prof. Vassilis Zikas on Security of Blockchains, Friday 8/3, 17:00, Multimedia Amphitheater

[kbitsak at cslab.ece.ntua.gr]

---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Fwd: [ece-dep] Lecture by Prof. Vassilis Zikas on Security of
Blockchains, Friday 8/3, 17:00, Multimedia Amphitheater
From:    "Georgios Goumas" <goumas at cslab.ece.ntua.gr>
Date:    Wed, March 6, 2019 9:52 am
To:      "Parallel and Distributed Systems Group" <pdsg at cslab.ece.ntua.gr>
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-------- Forwarded Message --------
Subject: 	[ece-dep] Lecture by Prof. Vassilis Zikas on Security of
Blockchains, Friday 8/3, 17:00, Multimedia Amphitheater
Date: 	Wed, 06 Mar 2019 08:59:15 +0200
From: 	Aris Pagourtzis <pagour at cs.ntua.gr>
Reply-To: 	pagour at cs.ntua.gr
Organisation: 	National Technical University of Athens
To: 	Dep <dep at ece.ntua.gr>




Αγαπητοί συνάδελφοι,

Με χαρά σας προσκαλούμε σε ομιλία εξαιρετικού συναδέλφου, αποφοίτου του
ΕΜΠ, που θα γίνει την Παρασκευή 8/3 στο Αμφ. Πολυμέσων, ώρα 17:00.

Παρακαλώ προωθήστε σε φοιτητές και συνεργάτες σας.

Με εκτίμηση,

Άρης Παγουρτζής


*Title:* Security of Blockchains against Incentive-Driven Attacks
*Abstract: *In traditional cryptographic analysis, an application or
protocol is deemed "secure" if it realizes its task against /*any
*/adversarial strategy, however mischievous. While this approach yields
strong security guarantees, in many cases it's overpessimistic since it
neglects the incentives that lead participants to deviate from their
prescribed behavior, resulting in solutions that defend against unlikely
attacks.
In this talk we present the "Rational Protocol Design" (RPD) framework,
which formally incorporates adversarial incentives into a composable
cryptographic protocol design. We showcase the benefits of the framework
by applying it?in combination with recent developments on the composable
analysis of blockchains?to analyze blockchain protocols like Bitcoin.
Our treatment captures, in a cryptographic framework, how knowledge of
the attacker's incentives can be used to circumvent known impossibility
results and/or derive a fallback rational-security notion.
*?? *
**
*Bio: Vassilis Zikas is an Associate Professor and Vice-Director of the
Blockchain Technology Laboratory at the University of Edinburgh. He is
also a Research Fellow (Area Leader: Secure Multiparty Computation) of
the blockchain company IOHK. He was previously Assistant Professor at
the Computer Science department at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
(RPI), Senior Research Associate in Cryptography and Information
Security at ETH Zurich, Research Fellow of the Simons Institute for the
Theory of Computing, UC Berkeley, and postdoctoral researcher at UCLA
and at the University of Maryland. His research has been supported by a
career development (Ambizione) grant and a postdoctoral fellowship from
the Swiss National Science Foundation. *Vassilis received his PhD from
the Computer Science Department of ETH
Zurich and his diploma from the School of Applied Mathematical and
Physical Sciences at NTUA, and has been a long-term affiliate of
the Computation and Reasoning Lab (CoReLab) of NTUA.
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